Organizational Response
During the night of January 28, 2011, several teams of surgeons and emergency physicians were rapidly established to carry out initial triage. Basically, each team consisted of general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, and critical care nurses. These multidisciplinary teams then transferred patients to the appropriate treatment site. Data were recorded for sex, age, site of injury, type of injury, need for immediate surgery, and type of surgery. Farther from the casualty reception zone, separate areas were designated for dealing with families, friends, and the media.
Patients were classified according to the site of injury, such as head and neck, chest, abdomen, extremities, and multiple injuries. The types of injury were from firearms and rubber bullets, stabs, blunt object traumas such as from rock or stone throwing, tear gas inhalations, and motor vehicle run-overs. After initial triage, several subspecialty teams were consulted that admitted the patients when required.
On January 28, 2011, in an attempt to hamper protesters from organizing demonstrations, there was an almost complete disruption of Internet, cellular, and most landline phone communication services by the regime. 3 This greatly inhibited mobilizing more medical personnel. Thus, medical staff present on-call on January 28, January 28, 2011, and 22 volunteer surgeons who were participating in the demonstration at Tahrir Square at that time, rushed to Cairo University Hospital after noticing the pattern of the organized escalating violence. Eighteen operating theaters on January 28 were simultaneously functioning to cope with the extent of the mass casualties.
Cairo ambulance transportation services belong to the "Central Ambulance Service," which is an independently operating organization responsible for patient emergency transportation. This organization operates independent of Cairo University Hospital. It basically works on the simple strategy of transporting casualties on a caseby-case basis, to the nearest suitably equipped available hospital. Because Cairo University Hospital is the nearest to Tahrir Square, it did bear the brunt of the "first wave" of mass casualties. With partial restoration of communication services at a later stage, the "Central Ambulance Service" was instructed to transport all surgical emergencies other than trauma cases to other hospitals, so as to allow Cairo University Hospital to cope with the Tahrir Square mass casualties. Obviously, at this time, no elective surgery was performed at Cairo University Hospital. On the night of January 28, 2011, elective surgical inpatients at the 13 surgery departments at Cairo University Hospital were immediately transferred to other nonsurgical departments, allowing all surgery departments to efficiently deal with the mass casualties.
Disruption of communication services affected all interhospital communication services. However, Cairo University Hospital intrahospital communication services were intact and fully functional, as this is a totally independent internal system.
The manager of the casualty department, who was the overall incident commander, led the incident administrative team. The main task of the administrative team was to mobilize all hospital resources that were not readily available at hand, such as opening all supply storages (to the extent of breaking the locks of some storage facilities) for additional medical supplies, such as surgical sutures and endotracheal tubes since January 28 happened to be on Friday, a weekly holiday in Egypt. One of its main tasks was dealing with families and friends of the injured and the media.
Thirty additional intensive care unit beds were made available for mass casualties. Because Friday is a weekly holiday in Egypt, the 7 cardiac catheterization intensive care unit beds were all free at that time, as all patients for cardiac catheterization would have been admitted on the coming Saturday, the first working day in Egypt. Five nonventilated medical intensive care unit patients who were in a stable condition were transferred to the intermediate care unit. Five postsurgical intensive care unit beds, 6 neurosurgical intensive care unit beds, 2 thoracic intensive care unit beds, and 5 transplant intensive care unit beds were all made available at that time and were fully used. In addition, the administrative team hastily equipped 2 extra resuscitation shock rooms, using monitors and equipment from storage.
The administrative team arranged all blood donations from families and friends of the injured, and at no time was there any shortage of blood. At a certain point, requests for blood donors were turned down as the blood bank was filled to capacity (3000 500-mL units) by the morning of January 29.
Clinical Data
Patients in a mass casualty event are traditionally triaged into "immediate care," "delayed care," "walking wounded," and "dead" categories. Three thousand twelve patients were triaged; 2559 patients triaged as "walking wounded" and "delayed care" were treated in the outpatient treatment area. Four hundred thirteen "immediate care" serious and critical patients who required resuscitation were immediately admitted and transferred either to operating theaters or for nonsurgical management. Forty fatalities were seen.
The "mass casualty" event was soon converted to a "multiplecasualty" event by first sorting out, in a rapid triage, nonsurgical from surgical emergency. Surgical teams consisted of mostly ophthalmology, general surgery, cardiothoracic surgery, orthopedics, and neurosurgery. All surgical specialties and subspecialties were simultaneously available, and patients were continuously evaluated and reevaluated to prioritize which surgical procedures should be performed first or simultaneously, and what could be stabilized for a later intervention.
During the first 10 hours that saw the arrival of the majority of casualties, there was a clear, "planned" progressive escalation of violence from the police force confronting the demonstrators. During the first 2 hours, all patients suffered from respiratory distress due to tear gas inhalation; some victims brought the tear gas canisters, all with "expired dates," probably adding to their problem. The next 2 hours saw the police using shotguns, as protesters arrived sprayed with shotguns pellets to the extremities, chest, and face. This was followed by casualties arriving with nonfatal gunshot wounds. In the last 4 hours, casualties arrived with clear evidence of apparent, "intentional," and precise "sniper" potentially fatal gunshot wounds to the head, neck, and chest.
RESULTS
Of the total 3012 trauma patients transferred from Tahrir Square to Cairo University Hospital between January 28, 2011, and February 4, 2011, 453 "immediate care" patients were admitted as inpatients. Their mean age was 27 years (range, 14-45 years). There were 444 injured men and 9 women. Among a steadily increasing number of casualties, 7:00 PM of January 28, 2011, saw the peak number of 70 casualties arriving within a 1-hour period.
On splenectomies. Liver lacerations were sutured in 8 patients and packed in 2 patients to control massive bleeding. Two cases of gastric injuries were repaired. One patient underwent pancreatic injury repair.
Urinary tract injuries required urinary bladder repair in one patient. Another patient required nephrectomy for multiple kidney lacerations. Whereas, a third patient required ureteral repair.
In 2 cases of pharyngeal lacerations, 1 patient underwent pharyngeal repair and the other patient with extensive pharyngeal laceration required gastric pull-up. Two patients underwent tracheostomies for tracheal injuries.
Twenty-nine patients underwent vascular surgery. Saphenous venous grafts were used to repair 6 femoral artery injuries, 4 brachial artery injuries, 3 popliteal artery injuries, and 2 axillary artery injuries, whereas there were 3 internal jugular vein injuries, 3 femoral vein injuries, and 1 popliteal vein injury. Seven fasciotomies were performed: 6 on the lower limbs and 1 on the upper limb.
Of the 41 patients admitted for chest trauma, 34 patients had hemothorax and 7 patients had pneumothorax. Five patients underwent emergency thoracotomies: 2 for massive air leak, 2 for stab wounds to the chest with huge hemothorax, and 1 patient suffered a stab wound to the heart that led to laceration of the right ventricle, which was successfully repaired and the patient was discharged 4 weeks later. One hundred seventy-three patients underwent surgery for ruptured globes. Nine of which were bilateral resulting from shotgun pellets.
Twenty-eight patients underwent neurosurgery. Of these, 11 patients underwent bone elevation and dural repair for compound depressed fracture as a result of stone or rock blunt object trauma, 8 patients underwent extradural hematoma evacuations, 3 acute subdural hematoma evacuations, 1 intraventricular hemorrhage, 1 intracerebral hemorrhage (Fig. 2) , and 4 gunshot injuries to the head.
Thirty-nine patients with fractures required fixation either internally using plates and screws or externally using an Ilizarov external fixator. Of these, 11 had a fractured femur, 7 had a fractured tibia, 2 had a fractured humerus, 4 had a fractured radius, 3 had a fractured ulna, 4 had a fractured spine, 4 had a Pott fracture, 3 had fractured metacarpals, and 1 had a fractured patella. Of these 39 patients, 4 patients with open fractures suffered from peripheral nerve injuries to the femoral, common peroneal, ulnar, and median nerves Of 5 patients with closed facial bone fractures, 2 underwent open reduction.
Forty of 453 patients (8.8%) did not survive their injuries. Twenty-six of 40 patients either were "dead on arrival" or died within minutes, despite resuscitation attempts. Of these 26 fatal injuries, 14 were gunshot wounds to the head, 4 to the chest, 3 to the abdomen, 2 to the neck, 1 to the thigh, 1 to the head and chest, and 1 was a vehicular run over. Mortalities before surgical intervention included 3 of 40 patients with gunshot wounds to the head and 1 of 40 patients with more than 70% of his body burned. Two of 40 were intraoperative mortalities due to abdominal firearm injuries; 1 patient received injury to the liver and the inferior vena cava, whereas 1 patient received injury to the liver, diaphragm, and the right lung. Eight of 40 postoperative mortalities were after debridement for frontal lobe laceration; ligation of both internal iliac artery injuries and packing for pelvic bleeding; secondary hemorrhage after repair of femoral artery injury; irreversible shock due to massive hemorrhage from a popliteal artery injury; lung and heart injuries from a gunshot to the chest; liver packing and ligation for liver and iliac vein injuries; severe hemorrhage from the paravertebral plexus of veins; and septic shock after gunshot injury to the liver, the right hepatic vein, the diaphragm, and the lung.
Of 30 critical patients admitted to the intensive care unit, 12 died later on. Those Twelve critical fatalities constituted, in our opinion, unavoidable fatalities.
DISCUSSION
We documented the sequences of our medical response to the Tahrir Square mass casualties between January 28, 2011, and February 4, 2011. The type and severity of the injuries in mass casualties have been documented in medical literature. Articles from Israel 3, 4 and Beirut 5,6 describe mass casualties of blunt traumas resulting from stone throwing, 3, 7 cut and stab wounds, 4 firearm injuries, and tear gas inhalation. [8] [9] [10] During the Egyptian uprising, firearms resulted in the majority of injuries (93.1%), followed by stab wounds (3.5%), blunt trauma from stone throwing (2.6%), and finally tear gas inhalation (0.4%).
The type of injury differs with the type of weapon used. Injuries to the head and neck are more common with stone throwing, 7 whereas injuries to the limbs are mostly seen with firearms. 11 In Belfast hospital, 500 casualties were admitted over a period of 3 months, the majority of which were gunshot injuries mainly to the limbs. 12 In Tahrir Square demonstrations, the large number of head and neck injuries (52.9%) were due to shotgun pellets, extensively used by the Egyptian riot police aiming at the head, strongly indicating an intension to kill. Consequently, head injuries were mostly responsible for both immediate and late fatalities (45%).
Our experience with Tahrir Square casualties shows that 96.6% of patients suffered penetrating traumas, most of which required urgent surgery. This experience is quite different from suicide bombing attacks in which most of the seriously injured patients with penetrating traumas are dead in the field because of the more devastating effects of nails or metal fragments added to the bomb and the presence of the suicide bomber among civilians in crowded places. 13 Victims of terrorist bombing attacks are prone to the so-called "polyagression," a combination of mechanical trauma, burns, lung blast injury, and crush syndrome in a multidimensional injury pattern, 14 a pattern quite different from what we experienced with the Tahrir Square casualties.
A plan has been devised and developed to deal with mass casualties in the future. 15, 16 On the basis of the valuable experience gained from the Tahrir Square uprising, Cairo University Hospital has revised and upgraded the annual drill plan for a mass casualty event that mobilizes all hospital emergency systems. Currently, all medical personnel in Cairo University Hospital are well acquainted and adequately trained to fulfill their roles and assignments during a mass casualty incident.
During the night of January 28, 2011, we immediately evacuated all elective surgical inpatients from the general surgery department of Cairo University Hospital and transferred them to other nonsurgical departments to accommodate the massive flow of casualties (339 operations). Several assembled teams performed initial triage. In our experience, it was obvious that general and orthopedic surgery teams were the most suitable teams that could primarily deal with mass casualties whereas other surgical and nonsurgical special-ists and subspecialties could be called upon later, once the patients' condition had been stabilized. The assembled multidisciplinary teams then transferred patients to the appropriate treatment areas.
Several lessons have been learned. First, in case there is no backup beeper system, there must be an independent autonomous mobilization response plan that always assumes a possible total disruption of communication services. Physicians, nurses, and all medical personnel should know where to head and which medical teams they should form or join at the time of a disruption of communication services. Second, a basic minimal number of emergency team physicians, nurses, and medical personnel should be available at all times in hospitals the size of Cairo University Hospital to be able to cope with at least the "first wave" of mass casualties. Third, with the disruption of communication services, one has to do with the "at-the-time" available manpower, and what we noticed is that not all nonsurgical nurses were properly and adequately experienced in emergency services, so we recommend that all nurses should spend a longer part of their training in emergency services.
Continuous reevaluation is essential in mass casualty event management. This helps with reassessing priorities for treatment and management in such a fluid, dynamic, and ever-changing situation, especially when there could be certain unavoidable, limited resources that tend to create bottlenecks such as computerized tomography scans, intensive care unit beds, or available operating rooms.
During mass casualty events, it is essential to properly deal with families and friends who could always present a potential impediment for fast and proper management of mass casualties. We set up a special communication center for families and friends that was staffed by social workers and administrators. A medical staff member acted as a liaison to help relay information regarding the injured to the waiting next of kin. We set up a separate media room with a hospital public relations' representative who could give accurate updates and answer questions. We hope that the experience gained in handling the Egyptian uprising will assist us and other emergency medical service agencies to optimize better management of mass casualty events of such magnitude. Our administrative team provided security to the best of their abilities. It is worth mentioning that despite the huge number of casualties arriving in such a short period, there was still a sense of spur-of-the-moment "decorum" from all families and friends, with no serious security lapses. All families and friends were very polite, cooperative, helpful, and precisely followed attending physician instructions.
Fast triage, frequent reassessments and reprioritization were essential for a better outcome. Having said that, there will always be factors such as intended or unintended disruption of communication services that seem beyond planning. On the other hand, in our particular case, other factors acted greatly in our favor, namely, the fact that the Tahrir Square uprising was located near the largest hospital in the Middle East. In addition, the large number of volunteer surgeons and nurses who headed to Cairo University Hospital of their own resulted in a definite better outcome in such a dire situation.
In conclusion, we've described the pattern of injuries and our management of such an event. We believe that forming multidisciplinary teams of anesthesiologists and nurses headed by general and orthopedic surgeons was the key to our effective management of such a huge event.
